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utilities sector. Such incidents can and do result in both death and injury for the 
workforce, as well as costing companies millions of pounds in associated damages 
and compensation costs. Despite specialised tools, processes and training 
programmes, cable strikes still occur on a regular basis. The majority of cable strikes 
are, like many incidents within the construction industry as a whole, attributed to 
human error. However, current thinking has suggested that human error is itself a 
symptom, rather than a cause, and theories have developed to position the incident-
causing human error action as the final link in a much longer chain. This paper 
presents an exploratory study which sought to examine this theory within a specific 
context; the construction utilities sector and cable strike incidents. Seven interviews 
were undertaken with operatives within their work environments, which gathered talk 
around general safety and cable strike incidents. A thematic approach enabled 
patterns within the transcribed data to be extracted and contextualised within industry 
practice. Findings indicated that operatives assigned a variety of different causalities 
to their experiences of incident occurrence, which were then used to construct a 
taxonomy of the causal factors of cable strikes from the operatives' perspective. These 
factors were then analysed within the industry context to construct potential 'causal 
chains' which are able to link the site incidents to management policy. This study, 
although exploratory, suggests that application of the systems theory of human error 
is highly applicable to the construction industry, and that the focus of safety 
management and safety management research should look beyond operatives on the 
front line to seek further improvements in safety performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The construction industry is one of the most dangerous in the UK; it accounted for 
27% of all fatal workplace accidents in 2010/11, making it responsible for almost a 
third of all deaths at work (HSE 2011). Significant and inevitable hazards which affect 
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construction companies and more specifically the utilities installation and 
maintenance companies, are underground services. Services within the ground include 
high/low voltage cables, street lighting cables, water, gas, telecoms, drains and 
sewers. However, for the purposes of this study, concern is focused on incidents 
involving the electricity network, subsequently termed 'cable strikes'. The hazards and 
risks associated with this specific type of service are extremely serious, both to the 
health and safety of the workers and approximate public, alongside the financial 
repercussions of a cable strike (Stancliffe 2008). Indeed considerable efforts are 
ongoing to examine the underlying causes of accidents and incidents within the 
construction industry as a whole (HSE 2009a), and the utilities industry has developed 
its own innovative solutions to mitigate these incidents, such as air shovels and 
vacuum excavators (ODA 2011; ADP 2012). 
However, incidents still occur and utility safety training has recently focused on the 
human factor in terms of behaviours and attitudes to safety in the workplace (Industry 
Today 2011). Theories of human error have seen significant developments since 
Heinrich's (1980) study laid the majority of blame for incidents at the feet of 
operatives, and a systems approach now positions the human factor within the context 
of influential industry practices and processes. This study seeks to explore, from the 
site level upwards, the systems that potentially influence the behaviours and attitudes 
of the utilities installation and maintenance operatives as they carry out their works in 
this hazardous environment. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Utility Context 
An estimated 4 million holes are dug by utilities companies annually in the UK, a 
figure which does not include the many excavations carried out as part of ongoing 
construction projects (Stancliffe 2008). The precise number of cable strikes and 
subsequent injuries as a result of these excavations is more difficult to source due to 
parameters within the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences 
Regulations 1995 (HSE 2012a) and the Electrical Safety, Quality and Continuity 
Regulations 2002 (as amended) (HSE 2012b). However the utility distribution 
industry does make its own estimations, for example Industry Today (2011) puts the 
figure at 60,000 strikes annually that are reported, whilst industry insurer Zurich 
(2007) claims an average of 12 deaths and 600 serious injuries per year are attributed 
to cable strikes. 
Despite a lack of clarity in the figures, the potential severity of the consequences of 
cable strikes is not in dispute. Damage to underground services can cause fatal or 
severe injuries (HSE 2005) as well as the potential for fire or explosions, and these 
risks are not just to the workforce but also the general public. Even non-fatal shocks 
can cause severe and permanent injury (HSE 2010). Flash burns may occur as a result 
of arc formation; burns may be extensive and lower the resistance of the skin so that 
electric shock may add to the ill effects. Temporary blindness can also occur due to 
burning the retina of the eye (Hughes and Ferret 2007). Alongside the human costs, 
the financial repercussions can be severe. A recent case examined an accident in 
which an employee received life threatening 60% burns after striking a high voltage 
cable with a hydraulic breaker on London's Crossrail project in 2008. In addition to 
the disabling injuries received by the operative, the employing company was fined 
£55,000 with £30,000 costs (Prior 2012). 
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Such financial repercussions are commonplace within the industry, and insurer Zurich 
publish its own 'best practice guidelines for construction companies' to avoid 
underground cable strikes. Zurich (2007) warn that whilst insurance may cover the 
repair and legal costs for claims, it will not cover the costs of incident investigation, 
loss of contracts, insurance excesses, penalties and reduced bonuses. Indeed, the fines 
that can result from a utility service disruption often drive the total cost of the event 
even higher (Utiliquest 2010). 
With regard to human safety, the HSE have published detailed guidance for best 
practice in the form of Guidance Booklet HSG47 'Avoiding Danger from 
Underground Services'. HSG47 outlines the dangers which can arise from work near 
underground services and gives advice on how to reduce the risk (HSE 2005). HSG47 
requires detailed inspections prior to any excavation to ensure that all utilities are 
identified and safe systems of work employed to detect the presence of underground 
plant and services. Safe systems of work are a fundamental feature of HSG47 and 
include all aspects of the work; planning, utility drawings, cable locating devices and 
safe digging practice.  
Flyn et al. (2000) note that in industries where significant hazards exist, there is 
considerable attention paid to safety assessment, and this is evident within the utilities 
industry. Safety management systems, as established by the HSE in its guidance 
documentation, 'Successful Health and Safety Management' (HSE 2006) can be found 
within larger contractors of the industry. Its implementation looks to provide structure 
to the legislative and other safety management requirements of organisations, and 
articulate their practical implementation on sites (Howarth and Watson 2009). For 
example, Enterprise (2012), one of the UK's largest utility installation and 
maintenance contractors promotes its own safety programme 'TargetZero', launched in 

«with the belief that all accidents and incidents can be prevented «
 as well as 
establishing a safety management team to ensure full employee training, personal 
ownership of health and safety in addition to meeting all legislative requirements. 
However, cases brought to court reveal that the HSE Guidance and company 
procedures are not necessarily followed in practice. For example, HSE inspectors 
examining the Crossrail incident found that no effective lines of communication had 
been established, appropriate training in digging techniques had not been provided, 
key safety documentation showing the cable was not to hand at the work location, and 
although the site had been scanned no markings had been made to show the locations 
of buried cables. As this incident happened in a busy London street, the HSE 
inspectors felt it was '«completely foreseeable that cables would be present «' 
(Prior 2012). Following an incident in 2002, the HSE (2002) voiced a warning to the 
construction industry to ensure safe working practices are followed when working 
near buried electrical cables. This followed an incident where an employee suffered 
burns to the face and neck as a result of striking a live 11kV electricity cable and the 
employer fined £10,000, yet the investigation concluded that had the method 
statement actually bHHQIROORZHGLQSUDFWLFH
«this was a preventable accident.' 
Theoretical explanations for these behavioural challenges to procedures can be found 
within the management structures and payment systems of the utilities sector. In 
keeping with the practices of the construction industry as a whole, a large proportion 
of utilities work is subcontracted both by the operating companies to contractors, and 
also from contractor to contractor due to the fluctuating workload (Lingard and 
Rowlinson 2005), resulting in potentially elongated supply chains and highly 
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fragmented delivery systems (Loosemore et al. 2003). The utility industry 
subcontractors are paid on a price per metre basis as an incentive to increase 
productivity, facilitated by the ease with which outputs can be measured and rewarded 
(Harris et al. 2006). However, this practice has been found to encourage operatives, 
who are also paid on price, to work as fast as possible to make the most money in a 
day or shift. As speed often means cutting corners and taking risks, safety is often 
sacrificed (Spanswick 2007). In a work scenario where painstaking preparation 
through the use of Cable Avoidance Tools, followed by careful and precise excavation 
using hand tools or mini diggers is essential for cable avoidance, a payment structure 
based on speed of installation appears somewhat incongruous. 
Indeed, recent developments in training have shifted in focus from technical to 
behavioural. The online 'cable avoidance evaluation' assessment for operatives has 
been developed by a utilities industry training provider, to establish knowledge, 
confidence and attitudes rather than just technical knowledge to enable evaluation of 
skills gaps and training needs (Industry Today 2011). Such an approach acknowledges 
the people in the process, and their influence and participation within cable strike 
incidents; indeed, a human influence can be identified in the case studies noted above. 
Consideration of the human element as a causal factor in accidents and incidents is not 
uncommon within the construction industry as a whole (HSE 2009a) and associated 
behaviours such as inaccurate assessments, bad decisions and poor judgements are 
often judged the root cause of incidents (Perrow 1999; Dekker 2006). 
Theories of Human Error 
Traditionally, 'blame' was allocated to individual workers through their 'error' in terms 
of poor behaviour or inadequate risk perception. This approach is based on the work 
of Heinrich (1980) and his seminal examination of accidents at work, which drew the 
conclusion that 88% of workplace injuries were due to unsafe acts on the part of 
operators. Although this study has since been criticised for the choices made in data 
selection and classification that may have led to this high figure (Woodcock 2007), 
human error is still seen as a major cause of accidents within construction (Wilson 
2007; HSE 2009a). Indeed one HSE report (2003a) found that worker actions and 
behaviours contributed to over 70% of the accidents investigated, and such high 
estimations are not uncommon within industry (Wilson 2007). 
However there has been a paradigm shift in the overall positioning of human error 
within the accident context, and the view that work related accidents and injuries are a 
direct result of carelessness and unsafe behaviours has become outdated (HSE 2007). 
The systems theory of accident causation has challenged this approach. This theory, 
also known as the 'new view', states that 'Human error is the effect, or symptom of 
GHHSHUWURXEOH«WKDWLWLVV\VWHPDWLFDOO\FRQQHFWHGWRIeatures of peoples' tools, tasks 
and operating environment.' (Dekker 2006: 15). It states that people make incorrect 
assessments or take incorrect action as a result of failures in the systems which have 
created situations which dictate a certain course of action (Perrow 1999; Dekker 
2006). It is no longer accepted that the system will work correctly if not for the 
behaviour of some 'bad apples', rather there is a need for safety to be instilled at all 
levels of the organisation (Dekker 2006), including management, who may 
unwittingly create latent failures within the system through the choices they make in 
boardrooms (Reason 1990; Kletz 2001). Cultural influences have also been suggested 
to affect people working within complex systems, and therefore can influence safety 
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in terms of acceptance of authority, need to conform to the social groups within 
organisations as well as organisational culture itself (Strauch 2004). 
This systems approach has also been acknowledged within construction industry 
research. The HSE (2009b) commented that although inappropriate actions and 
behaviours did contribute to incidents on sites, they were in the majority founded on 
weakness inherent within site management processes. The report found indications 
that causal factors were operating from well beyond the physical location of 
construction sites. For example, contracting strategies commonly employed within 
industry and the levels of responsibility and accountability at higher levels of 
management were indicated as contributory factors to accidents on sites. The report 
clearly categorises these 'mezzo' factors, such as inappropriate procurement systems 
and supply chain arrangements, and also 'macro' factors, such as potentially immature 
corporate systems and inappropriate enforcement, as areas of latent influence that 
directly affect construction sites. 
Awareness of these higher level factors was also demonstrated in the findings of the 
earlier HSE Study (2003a), which articulated the potential links between site based 
causal factors and underlying issues such as design or client influences. However, as 
Chaplin (2006) noted in his report for the Main Contractors Group examining 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDOµVDIHW\VWUHVVRUV¶DQGWKHUHODWLRQVKLSWRDFFLGHQWVZLWKLQWKH8.
construction industry, accident investigation findings will vary depending on the focus 
of the investigating team. A focus on human error will seek behavioural causes as 
opposed to a systems approach to safety. Chaplin identified time based pressure, lack 
of attention to procedures, and production pressures as the key systemic root causes of 
accidents on UK sites, whilst also suggesting that personal behaviour and competence 
were significant human factors, highlighting workplace culture as a key area of 
concern. 
However, despite the use of a systems theory approach within construction safety 
research (HSE 2009a) to date there has not been in-depth application of the theory to 
accidents at site level. The HSE has called for research to improve understanding of 
the links, the systemic connections, between accidents on sites and project factors 
such as project stage, size of contractor and type of works in progress (HSE 2003b). 
More commonly, the potential causes of systemic failures with relation to safety are 
examined solely at the mezzo and macro level, with failures at site level labelled as 
active (Lingard and Rowlinson 2005) rather than latent, and which retains association 
with human error, rather than completing the theoretical chain. 
METHODOLOGY 
This study employed a qualitative and interpretivist approach (Creswell 2003; Flick 
2009) in its desire to seek out the subjective experiences, understandings and attitudes 
of operatives. Semi-structured interviews were employed as the exploratory tool 
(Gillham 2005), and were undertaken with a sample of convenience consisting of 
seven members of a utilities distribution operational workforce. The interviews 
employed open questions to enable probing where appropriate (Fellows and Lui 2008) 
and facilitate development of talk around safety. 
Whilst this small sample size and selection process does not allow for generalisation, 
it does provide insights as to the perspectives of operatives with regard to safety, cable 
strikes and the potential causes that lie behind them, and indeed reached a level of 
saturation within the data (Kumar 2005). These initial interviews were carried out to 
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start to bring the picture into focus (Fellows 2008), rather than take the finished 
photograph, and the findings will be used to inform and develop further lines of 
inquiry and research in this area. It can also be argued that given the peripatetic nature 
of utilities distribution, the operatives' experiences, perceptions and attitudes are likely 
to be common within the industry as a whole. 
The interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed verbatim and subsequently coded, 
to highlight themes, consistencies, inconsistencies, patterns and irregularities 
(Silverman 2001; Langdridge 2005) when the data was viewed through the lens of the 
literature. Attention was given to the causal factors as developed through the 
operatives' talk, and the connections and interactions described between them. These 
factors were further analysed to enable the development of causal chains, sparked by 
the initial thematic associations from the data, and developed within the context and 
understanding of industry practices. 
FINDINGS 
A prominent and overarching finding was that all the operatives were aware of the 
safety risks and hazards associated with their work and the safety procedures in place 
to manage and prevent them. However, all but one of the operatives interviewed had 
struck a cable in the course of their work. Interestingly, the majority could not 
articulate why the cable strike had occurred, and were reluctant or unable to speculate 
as to any underlying or contributory causes. Indeed, this was further associated with 
the proverb 'accidents will happen'; that accidents cannot be avoided, all risk cannot 
be removed, and cable strikes are an inevitable part of the work. 
Therefore, in order to explore potential causal factors further through a systemic lens, 
the operatives talk was analysed as a whole to draw out the most prominent themes 
that developed through indirect discussions of the causal factors of cable strikes, 
rather than seeking direct explanations for incidents the operatives had been involved 
with. These findings are illustrated in Figure 1 below: 
 
Figure 1: Causal factors of cable strikes 
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Analysis of the data enabled the identification of four distinct causal factor 
'categories'; equipment, environment, cut corners and communication. Both 
'equipment' and 'cut corners' were closely associated by operatives with money, and 
more specifically the management's money. Lack of expenditure for the correct 
provision of work equipment was a common criticism and the availability of tools and 
equipment was directly associated with an increase in risk within work practices. 
Methods of payment, either by rate per metre laid or the provision of a bonus for work 
completed within a specific timescale, were also associated by the operatives with an 
increase in risk and the potential for incidents. Although the hazards of the work were 
clearly articulated and understood, the operatives positioned these two factors directly 
in competition with safe working practices, including simply taking the time to follow 
procedures. It was argued that there was no motivation to work in the correct manner 
when incentives encouraged another route. 
Money also constructed a barrier between the site and managements teams, which 
further developed through the talk within the category of 'communication'. The 
operatives felt there was a lack of communication and management knowledge and 
understanding of the site environment and actual requirements needed to follow the 
policies and procedures they had set down. Management were criticised for making 
poor decisions regarding work practice when alternatives were available, as well as 
developing 'onerous' procedures. The operatives also felt that when they raised 
problems or concerns they did not appear to be addressed, such as near miss data 
requested by management but not revisited either through feedback or demonstrable 
changes in practice. 
The final categorisation of 'environment' laid the blame for incidents on the previous 
workforce who had not followed their own procedures in installing or maintaining 
their utilities, however these operatives were operating within the context of all the 
other potential causal factors which could have resulted in their own poor work 
performance. 
Reference to the literature and the wider discussions around safety as experienced by 
the operatives in their daily work enabled the mapping of these site level causal 
factors, connecting the site incident to the macro and mezzo factors higher up the 
causal chain. An example of one such chain can be seen in Figure 2 below: 
 
 
Figure 2: Causal Chain Example 
Although highly simplistic in structure, this illustration demonstrates the chain of 
factors that connect commercial policy directly to a cable strike within just five links 
of the chain. The flow of influence from site to office, or rather office to site, can be 
clearly identified from the data provided by the operatives and the associated 
management practices. The contributory links in the chain, represented as arrows, are 
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shown on contrasting sides to reflect the fragmented nature of the communication 
between the site and the office, as articulated by the operatives. Overall, the 
development of the causal chains through the analysis inevitably led to the 
commercial policy of the company as the key causal factor at the final link. In reality, 
this policy will be the product of many other factors, however it has been employed 
here as a symbol of management practice and as a direct challenge to the health and 
safety policy that will inevitably sit beside it. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
When the utility operatives' talk around safety was analysed, the 'system' with relation 
to human error and accident causation became immediately apparent. The 
categorisations of the data demonstrated the close association between safety and the 
management system under which the operatives were working, as evidenced through 
the provision, or rather lack of provision, of equipment, the lack of communication 
through comprehensive information or the implementation of onerous procedures, and 
payment structures that fundamentally contradict safety processes in practice. This 
reference to management and the hierarchy in which the operatives are working can 
be seen as a manifestation of the system, in which operatives on site form the very last 





The resignation of the operatives that cable strikes are an inevitable part of their work 
could be considered to be the result of a lack of understanding of the systemic causal 
factors operating within their daily lives. Alternatively, this resignation can be seen as 
a clear comprehension of their current situation; should the system continue to operate 
as it does, the inevitability of cable strikes as a daily occurrence will indeed remain 
inherent within it. The latter is further supported by the repeated emphasis of 
communication, money and management as prominent causal factors, the operatives 
demonstrating the system in practice, and constructing their own causal chains behind 
the safety incidents they witness on a regular basis. 
However, one prominent anomaly within the data as a whole was the consideration of 
laziness or apathy as a causal factor. Whether this was a misconception on the part of 
the operatives who voiced this causal factor, or indeed the manifestation of an 
unavoidable 'human factor' could not be further explored within the scope of this 
study. Its presence within the data was an interesting challenge to the systemic theory 
of human error, suggesting a fundamental human characteristic, uninfluenced by the 
systems in which it was operating, and itself worthy of further research. 
This study, although exploratory, suggests that the systems theory of human error is 
highly applicable to the utilities sector, and indeed the construction industry on a 
wider scale. The focus of safety management and safety management research should 
look beyond operatives on the front line to seek further improvements in safety 
performance higher up the causal chain. More extensive research is recommended to 
develop the application of the systems theory of human error within this context. 
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